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Duncan Pritchard  




0. Introductory remarks 
 
I would like to extend my warm thanks to Eros Moreira de Carvalho, 
Nicola Claudio Salvatore, and Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues for their 
insightful comments on my book. I have very much enjoyed reflecting 
on these comments and developing my responses.  
 
1. Response to Eros Moreira de Carvalho 
 
Eros Moreira de Carvalho makes a crucial mistake when 
characterising my non-belief reading of On Certainty [=OC], so let me 
begin with that. According to this proposal, one is not to think of our 
hinge commitments as beliefs, at least not in the sense of belief that 
interests us (and which is needed for the set-up of the radical sceptical 
paradox), which is that propositional attitude that is the constituent 
part of rationally grounded knowledge (or ‘K-apt’ belief, for short). He 
writes that according to my proposal when one undertakes competent 
deductions where the entailed proposition is the content of a hinge 
commitment, then although one doesn’t acquire a (K-apt) belief in the 
entailed proposition, one does thereby acquire a propositional 
attitude towards that proposition. I presume that he means by this 
that one thereby acquires the hinge commitment in the target 
proposition as a result of undertaking the competent deduction. If so, 
I should emphasise that this is absolutely not my view. This is in part 
because I claim that the hinge commitments are there anyway, so at 
most one might become aware that one has such a commitment in this 
fashion, but one would not thereby acquire a hinge commitment in 
this way. But more generally this is because I also claim that hinge 
commitments are not acquired via any rational process, much less via 
a paradigmatic rational process like competent deduction. They are 
rather “swallowed down” (OC, §143) as part of the background of 
other propositions that one engages with rationally. This is why one is 
not ordinarily even aware of one’s hinge commitments, at least qua 
hinge commitments. As I argue in Epistemic Angst, I think that taking 
the visceral, “animal” (OC, §359) nature of hinge commitments 
seriously is crucial if we are to understand what Wittgenstein has in 
mind when he talks about this notion (and it is also crucial to 
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understanding why they are not beliefs, at least in the K-apt sense of 
the term). 
I fear that a failure to understand this element of my view has 
ramifications for some of the objections that Carvalho raises. For 
example, he notes a criticism I make elsewhere of the idea that one 
might rationally trust a hinge proposition, and thereby have a kind of 
belief in that proposition that would put it in the market for 
knowledge, even though one recognises that one has no rational basis 
for the truth of the proposition in question. I claim that this scenario 
is simply incoherent, in that recognising that one has no rational basis 
for the truth of the target proposition would lead one to be agnostic 
about the truth of the target proposition, and belief in the relevant 
sense that interests us (i.e., K-apt belief) is incompatible with 
agnosticism of this kind. The nub of the matter is that rational trusting 
is not the right propositional attitude to capture our hinge 
commitments, precisely because it can coexist with agnosticism. 
Carvalho claims that this critique ought to be just as applicable to my 
account of hinge commitments, since we can also become aware that 
we lack a rational basis for their truth. In particular, why doesn’t it 
follow that we are obliged to be agnostic about these propositions 
too, and hence not be committed to them? 
Carvalho is here failing to see a crucial difference between the 
two cases. Those who maintain that we can know hinge propositions 
by rationally trusting them are treating the propositional attitude in 
play as being belief-like in the relevant sense, and that’s what I’m 
critiquing. My claim, in contrast, is that this propositional attitude 
isn’t even belief-like, because it is not the kind of propositional 
attitude that is in principle directly reasons-responsive in the way that 
(K-apt) belief is. In particular, being agnostic about one’s hinge 
commitments is not even an option on my view, regardless of whether 
one recognises that one lacks a rational basis for the target 
proposition. This is something that I take Wittgenstein to be 
absolutely clear about, and is why hinge commitments have this 
visceral, animal nature. It is also why—and this is a distinctive feature 
of hinge commitments as I characterise them—one can recognise that 
one has no rational basis for the truth of a hinge commitment and yet 
be no less committed to it. In short, our hinge commitments are 
nothing like rational trustings precisely because the latter, but not the 
former, is compatible with adopting the kind of intellectual distance 
with regard to the target proposition that is represented by being 
agnostic about its truth. 
Carvalho also complains in this regard that I haven’t explained 
what notion of epistemic normativity applies to our hinge 
commitments. I must confess that I struggle to understand the 
challenge in play, given that hinge commitments are explicitly held to 
be arational. To demand a rational story about their adoption seems 
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to me to simply reject the whole framework of hinge epistemology. In 
particular, it is to attempt the kind of universal rational evaluation 
that Wittgenstein demonstrates to be impossible. Taking the idea that 
there can only be local rational evaluations seriously entails giving up 
the aspiration to rationally underwrite all our practices at once. (And 
note that this is not because we are epistemically limited in some way. 
As Wittgenstein makes clear repeatedly, the very idea of a universal 
rational evaluation of this kind is simply a chimera). Moreover, it’s not 
clear that any kind of normativity would be relevant to assessing our 
hinge commitments anyway, given their visceral, animal nature, since 
not only are they not under one’s control, but they are also not 
(directly, anyway) reasons-responsive either. 
In a more constructive vein, Carvalho puts forward what he 
calls an ability reading of On Certainty, which he takes to be a more 
plausible account of hinge commitments than the one that I offer. 
Interestingly, I toyed with an interpretive proposal broadly along 
these lines myself at one point, back when I was thinking of 
Wittgenstein as a kind of epistemic externalist, such that knowledge 
is always by its nature ‘brute’, in the sense of being “by favour of 
Nature.” (OC, §505)1 My fundamental problem with this sort of view, 
however, is that I just don’t see how these commitments can function 
like abilities, as they aren’t specific ways of doing anything. They are 
more like background commitments that enable one’s abilities to 
function as they do, such that our certainty is manifest in our action, 
rather than being specific abilities themselves. 
I think it is telling in this respect that Carvalho doesn’t offer 
any concrete examples of how a hinge commitment could function as 
an ability (instead he simply offers examples of normal abilities, like 
knowing how to ride a bike). I don’t think this is mere oversight on his 
part, but rather reflects the fact that once one tries to formulate such 
a case the view falls apart. What would it be to treat one’s hinge 
commitment that (say) one has hands as (only) the manifestation of 
an ability? For sure, one has lots of abilities that make use of one’s 
hands, but why would we think that those abilities are manifestations 
of the hinge commitment? Is the ability to scratch one’s nose a 
manifestation of one’s hinge commitment to one’s hands? If so, then 
any and every ability will be the manifestation of one’s hinge 
commitments, which is hardly plausible. But what more specific 
ability can we delineate here that captures the hinge commitment at 
issue? I think the problem we are confronting is that abilities are 
specific ways of doing specific things. Our hinge commitments, in 
contrast, constitute the backdrop of primitive certainty relative to 
which we manifest our abilities, and hence are not to be equated with 
the abilities themselves2. 
Carvalho goes on to argue that the ability reading ensures that 
the rational support one enjoys for one’s hinge commitments in such 
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cases can be factive. I think this is confused. I entirely agree with 
Carvalho that there can be such a thing as factive rational support, and 
that this is rooted in the manifestation of our abilities. Indeed, I argue 
for such a view myself, as part of a proposal I call epistemological 
disjunctivism, whereby the factive state of seeing that p (a state which 
is rooted in one’s perceptual abilities) can factively ground one’s 
perceptual knowledge that p.3 Where Carvalho goes awry is in 
thinking that such a proposal has any bearing on our hinge 
commitments. For one thing, Carvalho claims that he agrees with me 
that our hinge commitments do not amount to knowledge, so I’m not 
altogether sure why he wants them to enjoy a factive rational 
grounding (as opposed to merely manifesting states that are world-
involving, which is a very different matter). But if our hinge 
commitments do enjoy factive rational support, then how are we to 
understand that? Is my hinge commitment that I have hands rooted in 
my seeing that I have hands, for example? But now it seems we are 
back to a propositional reading of our hinge commitments—one that 
presumably holds that we have propositional knowledge of the target 
propositions—that is entirely contrary to what Carvalho intends. But 
if not that, then what? Merely the ability to see my hands? But that 
doesn’t seem right either, for all the reasons noted above, as this 
doesn’t capture the hinge commitment in play at all. The point is that 
it isn’t the idea that there can be factively grounded knowledge that is 
problematic, or even that this factively grounded knowledge can be 
rooted in one’s manifestation of relevant abilities. What’s 
problematic is the thought that the possibility of such factively 
grounded knowledge has any bearing on our epistemic relationship to 
our hinge commitments.  
 
2. Response to Nicola Claudio Salvatore 
 
Nicola Claudio Salvatore revisits a previous exchange of our 
where we discussed the extent to which a Wittgensteinian hinge 
epistemology of the kind that I defend was doomed to epistemic 
relativism.4 Here is the structure of the worry. If our system of rational 
evaluation essentially has arational hinge commitments at its core, 
and if there can be divergences in our hinge commitments, then how 
could rational resolution of deep disagreements (i.e., involving 
rational systems incorporating different hinge commitments) be 
possible? In short, why doesn’t hinge epistemology directly lead to a 
form of epistemic incommensurability, and thus to epistemic 
relativism? 
My previous response to this problem, which I have also 
articulated at length elsewhere,5 is to argue that the fact that there 
can be distinct rational systems, in the sense of incorporating distinct 
sets of hinge commitments, does not itself entail epistemic 
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incommensurability (and hence doesn’t lead to epistemic relativism). 
The reason for this is that the possibility of divergent sets of hinge 
commitments is quite compatible with there being substantial 
overlap in one’s hinge commitments. It is only if there is no significant 
overlap of this kind that one gets the incommensurability claim, since 
that would be required to ensure that there is no common ground 
which rationally structures the disagreement at issue. In contrast, so 
long as there are common hinge commitments, then there is always a 
basis on which to motivate a rational response to deep disagreements 
of this kind. 
I further argued that it is part-and-parcel of a Wittgensteinian 
hinge epistemology, as I interpret this proposal at any rate, that there 
will be overlaps in one’s hinge commitments. For one thing, on my 
account of hinge epistemology, there is far less variability in our hinge 
commitments than one might initially suppose. Our hinge 
commitments can seem to vary from culture to culture (‘I am speaking 
English’), epoch to epoch (‘I have never been to the moon’), person to 
person (‘My name is DHP’), and so on. But this surface variability is 
misleading, for all our hinge commitments codify a common 
overarching hinge commitment (the ‘über hinge commitment’, as I call 
it), such that one is not radically and fundamentally mistaken in one’s 
beliefs. This, coupled with one’s set of beliefs, determines the specific 
hinge commitments that one has. Expressed this way, we can see why 
many apparently distinct hinge commitments are effectively just 
superficially distinct manifestations of the same underlying hinge 
commitment—e.g., one is normally hinge committed to one’s name 
being such-and-such, but of course which particular name is plugged 
in here will vary from person to person. 
The foregoing means that there is less variability in our hinge 
commitments than we might have antecedently supposed, though it 
is still consistent with there being radical divergence in our hinge 
commitments. This is why a second point I make in Epistemic Angst is 
also important. This is that Wittgenstein offers us a broadly 
Davidsonian account of why in being able to make sense of a 
disagreement at all—such that we can regard the disagreement as 
contentful—we must be able to identify shared fundamental 
commitments. As he puts it at one point, in order to make moves in 
the space of reasons at all, such that one even counts as having made 
a mistake, one “must already judge in conformity with mankind.” (OC, 
§156) The crux of the matter is that it is a requirement on being able 
to express contentful thoughts at all, and thus being in the market for 
disagreement in the first place, that one does not radically diverge in 
one’s conception of the world, and that means that wholesale 
differences in one’s hinge commitments are simply not possible6. 
If that’s right, then divergence in hinge commitments is nothing 
to be afraid of. On the contrary, I take Wittgenstein to be accurately 
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describing here what is in fact our epistemic predicament, in that 
various pressing debates that we confront are of this kind. Relatedly, 
that deep disagreements are not epistemically incommensurable is 
entirely compatible with the idea that they can often be very hard to 
resolve from a practical point of view. Interestingly, however, once we 
understand the nature of these deep disagreements correctly—i.e., as 
involving a clash of hinge commitments—then it also becomes 
apparent how we should go about trying to resolve them. In 
particular, there is little to be gained from confronting such 
disagreements head-on, as if the other person’s hinge commitments 
could be dislodged by reason. Instead, such disagreements must be 
approached side-on. What I mean by this is that one should approach 
these kinds of disagreement by looking for common ground—i.e., 
shared hinge commitments, shared beliefs—and working to use that 
as a basis to change other beliefs that the person holds, and thereby 
change their mind. 
This highlights another feature of my account of hinge 
commitments, which is that although they are not directly responsive 
to rational considerations, they are indirectly responsive. This is 
because which specific hinge commitments one holds is a function of 
the über hinge commitment and one’s set of beliefs. The latter are 
directly rationally responsive in principle (unlike one’s hinge 
commitments). Accordingly, if one can change a person’s beliefs, then 
over time one can also change the specific hinge commitments that 
they hold. There is nothing mysterious about this. Wittgenstein, 
appealing to an example offered G. E. Moore, thought that it was a 
hinge commitment that one has never been to the moon. (OC, §171) 
Fast forward to the future, and imagine now that moon travel is so 
common that one could easily have been there without realising (e.g., 
a long-haul transatlantic flight might make a detour to the moon 
without this deserving comment). If one became aware of this, then 
one would no longer treat one’s never having been to the moon as a 
hinge commitment (e.g., it might now just be a belief that one holds). 
What goes here for the moon can go for other specific hinge 
commitments. If I want to convince you to abandon creationism, for 
example, then while there’s likely no point arguing that God doesn’t 
exist, there is a point to finding common ground and trying, on this 
basis, to convince you to change your beliefs in relevant ways. If I 
manage to change enough of them, then over time this disagreement 
might be rationally resolved. Modulo what I said earlier, I’m not 
denying that there are enormous practical difficulties in play here. My 
point is just that there is nothing in the notion of a hinge commitment, 
properly understood, that entails the kind of in principle problem for 
rationally resolving deep disagreements that is involved in the 
epistemic incommensurability claim. There is thus no direct route 
from a hinge epistemology to epistemic relativism. 
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Salvatore is unconvinced by my reply, and so tries a new tack. 
This time around he enlists my arguments elsewhere where I have 
tried to apply a Wittgensteinian epistemology to the debate regarding 
the rationality of religious belief. I call the resulting view of the 
rationality of religious belief quasi-fideism, and the basic idea behind 
it is one that I think Wittgenstein gets from John Henry Newman (1979 
[1870]).7 Roughly, what’s on offer is what (these days) we might call a 
parity argument. Yes, religious belief presupposes basic commitments 
that are essentially arational. But this does not show that there is 
anything essentially epistemically amiss with religious belief, much 
less that all religious belief is thereby arationally held, since all belief 
presupposes basic commitments that are essentially arational (but is 
no less rationally held for that). The resulting account of religious 
conviction is thus at root fideistic, since it allows that such conviction 
is fundamentally arational, while also treating ordinary (non-hinge) 
religious beliefs as no less rational as a result. 
Salvatore thinks that if fundamental religious conviction can be 
cast in terms of hinge commitments, then it follows that it must be 
possible for there to be the kind of radical divergence in hinge 
commitments that would allow for epistemic incommensurability. 
But this doesn’t follow at all. Even though two people might disagree 
over religious claims because they have different hinge commitments 
this doesn’t prevent them from agreeing over much else that is not of 
a religious nature. In particular, there is nothing preventing them from 
having substantial overlap in their hinge commitments. So there is 
nothing in the idea of religious hinge commitments, specifically, that 
licences epistemic incommensurability, and thereby epistemic 
relativism. If Salvatore wishes to resurrect his charge that my hinge 
epistemology leads to epistemic relativism, then he will need to argue 
directly against the claim that there are bound to be significant 
overlaps in one’s hinge commitments, on pain of us being able to make 
sense of each other at all. And nothing that Salvatore offers motivates 
that critical line.  
 
3. Response to Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues 
 
Tiegue Vieira Rodrigues is broadly sympathetic to the anti-
sceptical strategy that I set out in Epistemic Angst, so his concern is 
more regarding the detail. In particular, he worries about the nature 
of the propositional attitude in play when it comes to hinge 
commitments. I think the source of his concern is revealed in his 
remark that if hinge commitments are propositional attitudes, then it 
follows that they ‘could be the object of belief after all’, contrary to 
my non-belief account of them. Crucially, however, there is no such 
entailment, especially once one remembers the specific sense of belief 
that I have in mind. 
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As I noted in the book, the notion of ‘belief’ gets used in a wide 
variety of ways, not just by philosophers but also by theorists in other 
disciplines (e.g., cognitive science).8 There may be some sense of 
‘belief’ in which our hinge commitments legitimately count as beliefs. 
But my interest is in whether they count as beliefs in a very specific 
sense. Roughly, as noted above, by ‘belief’ I have in mind that 
propositional attitude which is a constituent part of rationally 
grounded knowledge (‘K-apt’ belief for short). The reason why I focus 
on this particular conception of belief is that this is the notion that is 
specifically relevant to the closure-style inference in play in the 
formulation of the closure-based radical sceptical paradox. It is thus 
important to ascertain whether hinge commitments are beliefs in this 
particular sense of the term. 
I argue that they clearly aren’t. This is because belief in the K-
apt sense has some basic conceptual connections to reasons and truth, 
which the propositional attitude involved in hinge commitments does 
not satisfy. For example, one such conceptual connection is that K-apt 
belief is not compatible with one recognising that one has no rational 
basis for the truth of the target proposition. Rodrigues seems to think 
that anything propositional can be the subject of a belief. I doubt that 
is generally true, but it certainly isn’t true of K-apt belief (though note 
that I raise an important caveat about this claim below). Wishful 
thinking, for example, is not K-apt belief. Accordingly, if everyone 
were so inclined as to wishfully think that p, then no-one could believe 
that p in the K-apt sense. (Rodrigues misses this point, I think, because 
he seems to hold that belief is transparent, in the sense that we 
cannot, as he puts it, be ‘blind’ about what we believe. But this is not 
a credible way of thinking about belief, especially in the K-apt sense, 
as the example of wishful thinking highlights. I might think that I K-
apt believe that p, and then come to discover that in fact I only 
wishfully think that p). 
In any case, if one accepts my description of the propositional 
attitude involved in hinge commitments—one which I think closely 
follows Wittgenstein’s own remarks in this regard—then it should be 
clear that one can never believe one’s hinge commitments in the K-apt 
sense. This is because to be hinge committed to a proposition is 
precisely to have a commitment to it that would survive the 
recognition that one has no rational basis for its truth. (Rodrigues 
mischaracterises this constraint, by the way, since he thinks the idea 
is that one’s beliefs must always be rationally grounded. But that’s not 
the claim at all. In fact, given what I’ve just said, there is no problem 
with bona fide K-apt beliefs lacking any rational ground or simply 
being irrational. The issue is specifically about one’s recognition that 
one’s has no rational basis for the truth of the target proposition).9 
Relatedly, our hinge commitments are different from K-apt beliefs in 
other ways, such as in terms of how they are acquired and how they 
Responses 
91 
Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia, vol. X, n. 19, 2019, p. 83-93 - ISSN 1981-4194 
change over time. (Note that they are not aliefs either—the latter can 
be in conflict with our wider beliefs, as when one’s aleif is phobic, but 
on my account of hinge commitments they cannot be in conflict with 
one’s wider beliefs since their content is in effect determined by 
them)10. 
There is an important caveat that we should raise here, which is 
that I’m not here denying that the very same proposition can at one 
time be the subject of a hinge commitment and at another time be the 
subject of a (K-apt) belief. Indeed, it is explicitly part of the view that 
this can be the case, and in fact there is nothing at all puzzling about 
this feature of hinge commitments on my proposal. Normally one is 
hinge committed to having hands, but if one awoke in hospital, dazed, 
after a serious car accident that injured one’s hands, then clearly this 
wouldn’t be a hinge commitment any more. Now it would make 
perfect sense to find out whether one has hands by looking to see 
whether they are there, and in the process form a (K-apt) belief that 
one has hands. Relatedly, as noted above, while it may be a hinge 
commitment for us that we have never been to the moon, I doubt this 
will be a hinge commitment for our grandchildren. And so on. The 
point is that on my account of hinge commitments different sets of 
beliefs will lead to the codification of different hinge commitments. 
Crucially, however, what we are describing here is not a situation 
where a hinge commitment is also (K-apt) believed, but rather a 
situation where a proposition which at one time functioned as a hinge 
commitment now functions as a (K-apt) belief. That is perfectly 
compatible with my claim that our hinge commitments cannot figure 
in closure-based inferences in the manner that the sceptic needs to 





DAVIDSON, D. (1983 [1986]). ‘A Coherence Theory of Truth and 
Knowledge’, reprinted as chapter 16 in Truth and Interpretation: 
Perspectives on the Philosophy of Donald Davidson, (ed.) E. LePore, 
Oxford: Blackwell. 
GENDLER, T. S. (2008). ‘Alief and Belief’, Journal of Philosophy 105, 
634-63. 
KIENZLER, W. (2006). ‘Wittgenstein and John Henry Newman On 
Certainty’, Grazer Philosophische Studien 71, 117–138. 
NEWMAN, J. H. (1979 [1870]). An Essay in Aid of a Grammar of Assent, 
Notre Dame, IN: University of Notre Dame Press. 
Duncan Pritchard 
92 
Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia, vol. X, n. 19, 2019, p. 83-93 - ISSN 1981-4194 
PRITCHARD, D. H. (Forthcoming). ‘Wittgensteinian Hinge 
Epistemology and Deep Disagreement’, TOPOI. 
______ (2018a). ‘Disagreement, of Belief and Otherwise’, Voicing 
Dissent: The Ethics and Epistemology of Making Disagreement Public, 
(ed.) C. Johnson, 22-39, London: Routledge. 
______ (2018b). ‘Epistemic Angst: Responses to My Critics’, Manuscrito 
41, 115-65.   
______ (2018c). ‘Quasi-Fideism and Religious Conviction’, European 
Journal for Philosophy of Religion 10, 51-66. 
______ (2017). ‘Faith and Reason’, Philosophy 81, 101-18. 
______ (2015). ‘Wittgenstein on Faith and Reason: The Influence of 
Newman’, God, Truth and Other Enigmas, (ed.) M. Szatkowski, 141-64, 
Berlin: Walter de Gruyter. 
______ (2013). ‘Davidson on Radical Skepticism’, Blackwell Companion 
to Donald Davidson, (eds.) E. LePore & K. Ludwig, 521-33, Oxford: 
Blackwell. 
______ (2012). Epistemological Disjunctivism, Oxford: Oxford 
University Press. 
______ (2011). ‘Wittgensteinian Quasi-Fideism’, Oxford Studies in the 
Philosophy of Religion 4, 145-59. 
______ (2010). ‘Epistemic Relativism, Epistemic Incommensurability 
and Wittgensteinian Epistemology’, Blackwell Companion to 
Relativism, (ed.) S. Hales, 266-85, Oxford: Blackwell. 
______ (2009). ‘Defusing Epistemic Relativism’, Synthese 166, 397-4. 
______ (2005b). ‘Wittgenstein’s On Certainty and Contemporary Anti-
Scepticism’, Investigating On Certainty: Essays on Wittgenstein’s Last 
Work, (eds.) D. Moyal-Sharrock & W. H. Brenner, 189-224, London: 
Palgrave Macmillan. 
______ (2001). ‘Radical Scepticism, Epistemological Externalism, and 
“Hinge” Propositions’, Wittgenstein-Jahrbuch 2001/2002, (ed.) D. 
Salehi, 97-122, Berlin: Peter Lang. 
SALVATORE, C. N. (2018). ‘Two Worries on Pritchard’s Epistemic 
Angst’, Manuscrito 41, 123-33. 
STEVENSON, L. (2002). ‘Six Levels of Mentality’, Philosophical 
Responses 
93 
Sképsis: Revista de Filosofia, vol. X, n. 19, 2019, p. 83-93 - ISSN 1981-4194 
Explorations 5, 105-24. 
WITTGENSTEIN, L. (1969). On Certainty, (eds.) G. E. M. Anscombe & G. 
H. von Wright, (tr.) D. Paul & G. E. M. Anscombe, Oxford: Blackwell. 
 
Notes 
1  See especially Pritchard (2001; 2005b). 
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manifest one’s abilities, it would be a mistake to therefore import this background 
of certainty into one’s understanding of the abilities themselves.  
3  See especially Pritchard (2012).  
4  See Salvatore (2018) and Pritchard (2018b).  
5  Most recently in Pritchard (forthcoming). See also Pritchard (2009; 2010; 2018a).  
6  See also Davidson (1983 [1986]) and Pritchard (2013).   
7  For my main defences of quasi-fideism, see Pritchard (2011; 2015; 2017; 2018c). For 
further discussion of the influence of Newman (1979 [1870]) on Wittgenstein’s On 
Certainty, see Kienzler (2006) and Pritchard (2015).  
8  For a useful taxonomy of different notions of belief, see Stevenson (2002).  
9  This is also why Norman, in the famous clairvoyant case that Rodrigues mentions, 
doesn’t count as having a K-apt belief insofar as he takes himself to have no rational 
basis for the truth of the proposition in question. He might well in some sense 
endorse that proposition, and such an endorsement might count as a belief in some 
loose sense. But it would not be a belief in the specific sense that I have in mind.  
10  For further discussion of aliefs, see Gendler (2008). 
                                                         
